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Comments
Pulliam's Pacific Progeny: Deep
Pockets in the Judges' Robes?
Judicial immunity is an historic doctrine that shields the judiciary
with absolute immunity from civil actions for damages resulting from
judicial acts performed within a judge's jurisdiction.' The doctrine
is based upon two major policies: the preservation of an independent
judiciary and the protection of appellate hierarchy. 2 The doctrine is
said to be as old as the common law itself.'
Both federal and state decisions upholding the doctrine proceed from
the assumption that judicial immunity existed at common law."
Modernly, judicial immunity in the United States is significantly
broader than the immunity provided at common law or in other
modern common law jurisdictions.5 The American version of the doctrine provides absolute judicial immunity and protects malicious abuses
of power as well as good-faith errors.6
Absolute immunity from civil liability has been applied to judicial
violations of federal civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 (Section 1983),' the principal statute under which most civil rights
actions are brought. 8 Section 1983 was enacted to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for legal, equitable,
1. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. For extensive discussions of the historic
background of judicial immunity see Block, Stump v. Sparkman And the History of Judicial
Immunity, 1980 DUKcE L.J. 879 (1980); R. Feinman & R. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and
Theory, 31 S.C.L. REv. 201 (1980).
2. See Pulliam v. Allen, ____U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1983 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting).
3. See Wyatt v. Arnot, 7 Cal. App. 221, 226, 94 P. 86, 89 (1907) citing Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio 120 (1846).
4. See Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1974.
5. See infra notes 63-90 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 63-151 and accompanying text.
7. 42 U.S.C. §1983. See infra notes 110-125 and accompanying text.
8. See WViGHr, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 121 (4th ed. 1983).
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or administrative relief against any person who, acting under color
of state law, causes a deprivation of any constitutional right. 9
In order to encourage litigation of Section 1983 actions which
ultimately benefit the public, courts have awarded attorneys' fees under
statutory and equitable exceptions to the "American Rule" that each

party bears its own costs in litigation.' 0 In 1975, however, the United
States Supreme Court held, in Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society," that one of these exceptions, the "private attorney general" doctrine," is inapplicable in federal courts. In response,
Congress enacted the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976

-

authoriz-

ing courts to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in actions
brought to enforce certain enumerated civil rights statutes, including

Section 1983. Codified at 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 (Section 1988), The
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 was enacted to further many
of the same purposes as the private attorney general doctrine by en4
couraging public interest litigation.'
In California state courts, however, the private attorney general
doctrine has survived the Aleyska decision.' I California has codified
the private attorney general doctrine at Code of Civil Procedure Sec-

tion 1021.5 (Section 1021.5).16 California courts still recognize former
federal authorities in interpreting the private attorney general doctrine,'
even though the doctrine is no longer applicable in federal courts.
The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Pulliam v.
Allen' 8 held that no judicial immunity exists as to prospective injunctive relief awarded in a Section 1983 action and that attorneys' fees
may be awarded in such a case under Section 1988."' The Court concluded that no immunity existed at common law as to prospective
injunctive relief against a judge.2 0 Further, the Court found that
9. See infra notes 110-125 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 110-125 and accompanying text.
11. 421 U.S. 240, 255-257 (1975). See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
12. The "private attorney general" doctrine provides for an award of fees to successful
public interest litigants. The term was first used in Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694 (2d Cir. 1943). The "private attorney general" doctrine is described infra at notes 187-224.
13. 42 U.S.C. §1988. See infra notes 200-218 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 215-218 and accompanying text.
15. See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 46, 569 P.2d 1303, 1315, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315,
326 (1977).
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021.5.
17. See Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal. 3d 348,
352, n.5, 657 P.2d 363, 365, n.5, 188 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875 n.5 (1983).
18. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S.Ct. 1970 (1984).
19. Id. at 1981-1982.
20. Id. at 1980.
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nothing in the language of Section 1988 indicated that Congress intended to expand on the common law immunity doctrine by immunizing judges against the award of attorneys' fees under Section 1988.2"
Relying on Pulliam, a California court of appeal in Lezama v. Justice
Court,22 sanctioned the filing of an independent civil action for
declaratory and injunctive relief and the attendant awards of attorneys'
fees under both Section 1988 and California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5.23 Lezama raises numerous questions regarding the scope
of the judicial immunity doctrine in California after the Pulliam
decision.
This comment will examine the doctrine of judicial immunity in
relation to public interest litigation in California.2" Initially, this comment will describe the common law roots of the doctrine of judicial
immunity and assess the propriety of relying on the common law as
a basis for delineating the scope and validating the utility of the doctrine in light of a continuing need to encourage public interest
litigation.2 5 A comparison of the equitable and statutory exceptions
to the "American Rule" in federal and state courts will demonstrate
that the policy considerations that compel the award of attorneys'
fees against a judge under Section 1988 equally compel an award of
attorneys' fees under the California private attorney general statute,
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.26 Finally, this comment will
suggest that limiting judicial immunity by permitting injunctive and
declaratory relief against a judge is entirely consistent with the common law as received by California and poses no constitutional con27
flict in the application of this limited liability.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IN ENGLAND
The doctrine of judicial immunity, though touted as being "as old
as the law," 28 may not be as old as doctrines of judicial liability.
Provisions for imposing liability on judges have existed since ancient
times, in different judicial contexts, and for different purposes.,
21. Id. at 1982.
22. 165 Cal. App. 3d 287, modified, reh'g granted, (1985).
23. Id. at 292-93. The decision was clear, however, that the award would run only against
the court as a public entity and not against the individual judge whose egregious conduct gave
rise to the action. Id. at 293, 297.
24. See infra notes 210-295 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 32-100 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 210-295 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 237-257 and accompanying text.
28. See Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 536 (1868).
29. The Hammurabi Code, for example, provided for twelve-fold damages against a judge
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Judicial immunity in England evolved in response to multiple
sociological and legal factors peculiar to the development of the English
judicial system.3" Absolute judicial immunity did not exist at ancient
common law. The doctrine was an historical development conferring
only limited immunity upon a limited group of judges.'
A.

Early English Law

In early English law the concept of appellate review as a means
of challenging the correctness of the decision of a judge was
unknown.32 In the tenth and eleventh centuries, a judgment of a common law court was challenged by an independent action brought in
another court. 3 This action evolved into the "complaint of false

judgment. ' 34 Successful challenges resulted in nullification of the earlier
judgment and imposition of a fine against the erring judge that was
payable to the court.3

In contrast to the common law courts, ecclesiastical courts provided
an appellate hierarchy to which unsatisfactory decisions could be

appealed. 36 This was an attractive model for the King's courts in that
it provided the principal advantage of enabling a higher court, as op-

posed to a collateral, inferior court, to authoritatively declare legal
precepts,37 thus achieving superiority over local courts. By statute,
whose "written verdict" was later disproved. In addition to punitive damages, the judge wa
permanently removed from the bench. (The Hammurabi Code and the Sinaitic Legislation,
§5 at p. 26 (C. Edwards trans., 1904 & Reissue 1971)).
The Visigoths imposed liability on a judge when the judge "refuses to hear a litigant or
decides fraudulently." Visigothic Code (forum judicum) (S.P. Scott trans., 1910 & Reprint
1982) Book II, tit. I, §XIX at p.28. Injuries resulting from judicial acts in the clear absence
of jurisdiction were compensable by the judge, who was compelled to "not only make restitution; but. . . to surrender an equal amount of his own property to the party injured." Id.,
§XVI at 24, 25. But even the Visigoths, whose concern for the preservation of judicial integrity
caused them to impose the foregoing civil penalties on a judge, realized the distinction between
errors of judgment and wrongful, malicious or corrupt behavior. No liability was imposed for
the former. Id., §XIX at 28. Restitutionary and punitive damages were assessed for the latter.
Id., §XXII at 28.
said to have been imposed
None of the foregoing penalties, however, are as severe as those "...
by Cambyses; who flayed a corrupt judge, and placed his skin in the judgment seat, as a
suggestive warning to his successors." Id. at 28, 29 n.l.
30. See infra notes 32-62 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
32. For a review of the English common law history, see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HtSTORY
OF ENGLISH LAw 234-40 (2d ed. 1937); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF EN LISH
LAW 664-68 (2d ed. 1898); Block, supra note 1; Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1.
33. This action was termed "forsaking the doom." See Block, supra note 1, at 881.
34. Id.
35. The fine was termed an "amercement." Id. at 881 n.12 and accompanying text.
36. Id. at 882.
37. Id.
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the complaint of false judgment was made a royal plea. 8 This enabled
the King's courts to establish control over the local courts by placing
the complaint of false judgment in the exclusive jurisdiction of the
royal courts. A judgment of the King's court could not be challenged
through a complaint of false judgment, however, because the King's
courts were courts of record. The proceedings therein were recorded
and assumed the nature of the royal prerogative - that the words
of the King were indisputable.39 The judgments of the King's courts,
therefore, were final.
By the fourteenth century, courts distinguished complaints against
a judge (the complaint of false judgment)4" from complaints against
a judgment, through the development of the writ of error." Barred
from attacking the factual findings which inhered in the sanctity of
the record, a dissatisfied litigant achieved review of the judgment by
attacking the legal conclusions with a writ of error.42 No action was
available, however, against a judge of record for his judicial acts. 3
The source, then, of modern judicial immunity, can be identified as
early as the mid-fourteenth century. 4 Not until several centuries later
and two influential opinions by Lord Coke did the relationship between the King, the King's Court, and the writ of error crystallize
into a well-defined doctrine of judicial immunity.
B.

Lord Coke's Influence

The doctrine of judicial immunity initially evolved as a limited immunity for a limited group of judges. 5 In two watershed cases, Lord
Coke established the immunity of courts of record from other rival
courts. The first of these cases, Floyd v. Barker,46 defined the policy
bases that continue to be stated as supporting the doctrine of judicial
immunity: (1) decisional finality, "7 (2) judicial independence from rival
courts, 8 and (3) public confidence in the judicial system. 9 The ma38. Statute of Marlborough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 19. See Pollack & Maitland, supra note
32 at 666.
39. See Block, supra note 1, at 883.
40. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1, at 205.
41. See Block, supra note 1, at 884.
42. Id.
43. Id.

44. Id.
45. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1, at 206.
46. 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1608).
47. "[1]f the judicial matters of record should be drawn into question ... there will never
be an end of causes: but controversies will be infinite." Id. at 1306.
48. "[Tlhe Judges . . .ought not to be drawn into question . . . except it be before the
King himself." Id. at 1307.
49. Id.
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jor significance of Floyd v. Barker, however, was in the limitation
of the immunity to judicial acts. Only acts of discretion as empowered
by law were considered to be51judicial acts.50 Extra-judicial acts were
afforded no such immunity.
The judicial act limitation of Floyd was followed by the jurisdictional limitation on immunity established by Lord Coke in The Case
of the Marshalsea. 2 This case established that a judge would be liable
for acts performed in the clear absence of jurisdiction, since these
acts were presumably not on the record." Conversely, a judge would
not be liable for wrongful acts in the abuse of jurisdiction, as such
acts were a matter of record .5 The immunity limited to judicial acts
became defined further by distinguishing a select group of judges to
whom the immunity would be available.
C. Superior and Inferior Courts Distinguished
The judicial act and jurisdictional limitations on judicial immunity
were followed by a limitation based on the distinction between superior
courts and inferior courts. 5 Subsequent cases developed a distinction
between judges of superior courts and judges of inferior courts.
Superior courts, "stand[ing] next to the King" ,56 had full immunity,
unlike inferior courts which were subject to control of the King through
prerogative writ.17 This distinction was based on a jurisdictional
limitation. 8 Superior courts had unlimited jurisdiction; inferior courts
had limited jurisdiction. Therefore the immunity was limited to the
extent of jurisdiction. 59 The limited immunity for a limited group of
judges soon led to the differentiation of good faith judicial errors
from malicious abuses of judicial power.

50. Id. at 1306.
51. The judicial act is one of discretion, while the ministerial act is one that the law requires

without discretion, and includes such acts as compliance with a writ from a higher court. See
Block, supra note 1, at 887 n.42 and accompanying text.
52. 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (C.P. 1610).

53. Id.at 1038.
54. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1, at 209.
55. See e.g. Miller v. Seare, 96 Eng. Rep. 673, 674-75 (1977); Taafe v. Downs, 13 Eng.
Rep. 15 (CP Ireland 1813).
56. Taafe v. Downs, 13 Eng. Rep. 15 at 18.

57.
58.
59.
inferior

See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1976; Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1, at 216.
See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 32, at 238-39.
One commentator suggests that the jurisdictional limitation distinguishing superior and
courts is no longer useful because many of the functions of the inferior courts even-

tually shifted to statutorily created administrative agencies. This shift effected a limiting of
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D.

Malicious Acts and Good Faith Acts Distinguished

By the end of the eighteenth century cases limited immunity to errors of judgment and imposed liability for malicious or corrupt acts."

The limitation was based partly on jurisdictional grounds. Malicious
acts were characterized as acts in the absence of jurisdiction and sub-

jected the actor to liability.6 '

On several occasions 62 Parliament enacted legislation regulating pro-

cedures for bringing actions against judges. These enactments were
consistent with the developing case law. By the mid-nineteenth cen-

tury, the common law in England recognized a doctrine of limited
judicial immunity. Immunity was not available when a judge acted
in the absence of jurisdiction or when the act, though within jurisdic-

tion, was of a malicious or corrupt nature.
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Reliance upon the historical dimensions of judicial immunity is the
63
most consistent reason cited for rote adherence to the doctrine.
Historically, common law immunity was only a limited immunity. The
historical dimensions, however, as a result of misapplication and
misinterpretation, became the basis for a6 vastly broader doctrine of
immunity than had ever existed before. 1

liability and an expansion of immunity in the inferior courts. The distinction between inferior
and superior courts, however misapplied or inconsistently interpreted, would provide the basis
for judicial immunity in the United States. See Block, supra note 1, at 896. Misinterpretation
of the distinction between superior and inferior courts may have been unavoidable. Commentators agree that judicial interpretation of the distinction is unclear. See Block, supra note 1,
at 893-94, notes 77-80 and authorities cited therein; Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1, at 217.
The distinction between inferior and superior courts was applied in the seminal opinion of
the U.S. Supreme Court regarding judicial immunity, Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868).
See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
60. See Drewe v. Coulton, 102 Eng. Rep. 217 (1787). For a discussion of actions alleging
malice against a judicial officer see Rubenstein, Liability in Tort of Judicial Officers, 15 U.
TORONTo L.J. 317, 326-30 (1964).
61. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1, at 218.
62. Justices Protection Act 1609, 7 Jac. 1, ch. 5; Justices Protection Act 1751, 24 Geo.
2, ch. 44; Justices Protection Act 1803, 43 Geo. 3, ch. 141; Justices Protection Act 1848, 11
& 12 Vict., ch. 44.
63. See, e.g. the discussion of Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. at 523, ("This doctrine is
as old as the law."); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. at 335, ("It has been the settled doctrine
of the English courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are aware of,
in the courts of this country."); Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 987, 4th ed. (1971),
("[J]udges always have been accorded complete immunity for their judicial acts. . .even when
their conduct is corrupt or malicious and intended to do injury." (emphasis added)).
64. See Block, supra note 1 at 897-900; Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1 at 223-43.
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Randall v. Brigham61 was the first United States Supreme Court
decision 66 to apply the doctrine of judicial immunity to a defendant
judge.6 7 In Randall, a disbarred attorney sought damages from the

state court judge who ordered his disbarment. In applying the doctrine to preclude recovery, Justice Field followed English common
law precedent in all respects, 68 noting that the doctrine is "as old
as the law." 69 The decision recognized the judicial act distinction.7
The Court held that ordering the disbarment of an attorney was a
judicial act, an exercise of judicial discretion unlike ministerial functions, the wrongful exercise of which might impose liability. The
jurisdictional limitation and the distinction between inferior and
superior courts was also followed."' Justice Field qualified the immunity, even as to superior court judges, noting that "malicious"
acts or acts clearly in the excess of jurisdiction would not be
immunized.7"
65. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
66. State court decisions prior to Randall were neither consistent nor uniform and represented
the judicial struggle to adapt common law principles of judicial immunity to the new Republic.
See Block, supra note 1 at 897-900; Feinman & Cohen, supra note I at 223-43.
67. Prior to Randall, however, the doctrine of judicial immunity as applied to other public
officers performing judicial functions had been discussed by the United States Supreme Court.
These early Supreme Court cases illustrate the judicial perception of the scope of the doctrine
of judicial immunity. As early as 1806, in Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. 330 (1806), Chief Justice
Marshall discussed the doctrine of judicial immunity. In Wise, a justice of the peace brought
an action against a judicial officer of a court-martial tribunal. The plaintiff alleged that the
tribunal was without jurisdiction over him because a justice of the peace was exempt from
military service. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff. After deciding
that a justice of the peace was exempt, and concluding that the court martial was without
jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "The Court and the officer are all trespassers" and
held that an action in trespass would lie against the defendant judicial officer. Id. at 337.
In Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 87 (1845), an action brought against the Postmaster General,
the doctrine was held to preclude liability based primarily upon the distinction between judicial
and ministerial acts. Immunity from prosecution for malicious or corrupt acts was not discussed,
as the parties apparently conceded that the acts were bonafide. Id. at 91. The dissent of Justice
McLean set forth the three grounds on which a public officer may be held responsible to an
injured party:
I.Where he refuses to do a ministerial act, over which he can exercise no discretion.
2. Where he does an act which is clearly not within his jurisdiction. 3. Where he
acts willfully, maliciously and unjustly, in a case within his jurisdiction.
Id. at 794-95 (McLean, J. dissenting). Notwithstanding the fact that the issue was moot because
of the stipulation that the actions were bona fide, Justice McClean reiterated that "the law
is clear where the facts are established." Id. at 797. Liability for actions on the third ground,
above, for "malicious" acts would "seem to result." Id. Kendall is of value in demonstrating
the judicial perception that the doctrine of judicial immunity was not absolute, and that the
common law limitations of the doctrine to good-faith acts continued to survive.
68. See Block, supra note 1, at 901.
69. Randall, 74 U.S. at 536.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Three years after Randall, the Supreme Court again addressed the
issue of judicial immunity. In Bradley v. Fisher,7 3 Justice Field
withdrew his qualifying remarks in Randall and made clear for the
74
first time in the United States that judicial immunity was absolute.
Bradley is the seminal American case extending absolute immunity
to the judiciary. 5 Under Bradley, judges of superior courts of general
jurisdiction are not civilly liable for any judicial acts, even if done
maliciously or corruptly.76
Bradley expanded the scope of the immunity by precluding liability
for malicious acts." This had the effect of obscuring the distinction
between superior and inferior courts. 78 This aspect of the opinion is
not clear, partly because examples cited by Field as "courts of general
jurisdiction ' 79 were actually courts of limited jurisdiction."0 Although
some state courts continued to distinguish superior and inferior courts, 8'
Field's opinion is considered to have supported the eventual demise
of this distinction.82 Bradley emphasized, however, the distinction between the judicial and ministerial act, a distinction that would become
more important in later decisions.
Bradley was based on policy as well as precedent. Justice Field
enumerated three major policies underlying judicial immunity. Judicial
independence, or the need to protect judges from coercion that would
affect their freedom to act upon their own convictions was the foremost
consideration.8 3 Second, the burden of litigating a personal action
73. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
74. See Id. at 351.
75. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). "Few doctrines were more solidly
established at common law ... as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine in Bradley."
Id.at 553-54.
76. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. at 351.
77. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1, at 245; P. Roth & K. Hagan, The Judicial
Immunity Doctrine Today: Between the Bench and a Hard Place. Origins and Development
of the Doctrine, I Juvenile & Family Court Journal at 4 (1984).
78. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note I, at 246.
79. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. at 351. "[T]he qualifying words used [in Randall to limit
liability to malicious and corrupt acts] were not necessary to a correct statement of the
law... judges of courts of superior or generaljurisdiction are not liable ....even when such
acts are . . . alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Id. (emphasis added).
80. Justice Field cited as examples, "a probate court" and "a judge of a criminal court"
both of which were courts of limited jurisdiction. Id. at 352. See also Feinman & Cohen, supra
note 1, at 246.
81. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1, at 249-50.
82. The distinction was lost by 1900. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 1, at 251-252,
Roth & Hagan, supra note 77 at 4; Note, Judicial Immunity - State Judicial Officials Are
Not Immune From Prospective Relief in an Antion Brought Under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or From
Paying Attorneys' Fees to Prevailing Parties Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988. 14 BA.T. L. R.
346, 349 (1985).
83. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. at 347.
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against a judge would destroy the usefulness of the judge and, according to Justice Field, would degrade the judicial office.8 ' Third, judicial
liability would destroy the finality of the judicial decision. An individual would simply need to allege malice and corruption in order
to maintain an action against a judge."5
Justice Davis dissented from the Bradley majority on the principal
ground that, when a judge has acted maliciously and corruptly, he
should be subject to the same suit as a private person.8 6 This dissent,
however, was but a vanishing area of solid ground rapidly being overtaken by the tidal wave of absolute judicial immunity. Bradley became
the leading authority on judicial immunity in the United States.'
The holding in Bradley was not supported by precedent. No broad
degree of immunity existed at common law," s despite Justice Field's
note that the doctrine is "as old as the law."' 9 The general rule of
judicial immunity prior to Bradley exempted malicious and corrupt
acts from the scope of the immunity." Furthermore, Bradley failed
to establish how the judicial immunity, developing as a limited immunity, was inadequate to protect the policies supporting the doctrine. The expansion to absolute judicial immunity simply was not
satisfactorily justified.
State court decisions prior to Bradley, were not uniform in defining the extent of judicial immunity." The judge-made expansion of
the common law doctrine was followed without analysis or dissent
by state and federal court judges who uniformly embraced the Bradley
doctrine. The development of the doctrine of judicial immunity in
California illustrates both the uniformity that Bradley achieved, and
the conspicuous lack of analysis with which state court judges accepted the new absiolute immunity.
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IN CALIFORNIA

Prior to Bradley, there was a paucity of case law dealing with judicial
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 349.
Id.
Id. at 357 (Davis, J. dissenting).

87.

See, e.g., Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (1926), aff'd. (per curiam) on the authority

of Bradley v. Fisher, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) ("The case of Bradley v. Fisher [Citations] is a
leading case in the courts of this country as to the immunity of judges.. .
88. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
89. See Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. at 356.
90. Supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text. But see Block, supra note 1, at 901 ("In
all respects Field's statements of the rules and doctrine of judicial immunity followed the
mainstream of precedent.").
91. For a thorough review of state court decisions by 1871; see Note: Liability of Judicial
Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YAE L.J. 322, 335 nn. 29, 30, 31 (1969).

1986 / JudicialImmunity

immunity in California. The few decided cases, however, demonstrate
that California courts at least implicitly followed the rule of qualified

immunity, imposing liability for malicious acts.92 Turpen v. Booth,93
was the first post-Bradley decision of the California Supreme Court

dealing with judicial immunity and is frequently cited as the seminal
case in California.9" Turpen, however, dealt not with the liability of
a judge, but that of a grand juror, holding that a grand juror was

absolutely immune from civil damages no matter how erroneous or
malicious his actions. 9" In addition to relying on Bradley, Turpen relied

on the familiar range of inconsistent English and American cases. 96
Turpen failed to define and clarify the extent of the immunity recog-

nized in California.
Continued reliance on historical precedent with only minimum
analysis marked the first decision of the California Supreme Court97
holding that a judge was absolutely immune from prosecution for
judicial action. Pickett v. Wallace" was an action brought against
the justices of the California Supreme Court seeking damages for a
contempt judgment and punishment that had been rendered by the

court, allegedly in the absence of jurisdiction and in a malicious manner. The court focused on jurisdiction, finding that when the court
had jurisdiction to adjudge contempt, the justices of the court were
92. The seminal case of Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 (1854) involved the liability of a quasijudicial officer, a Pilot Commissioner. The Downer court, primarily relying upon perceptions
of the historical dimensions of the doctrine, held that immunity from civil liability was "beyond
controversy", even for quasi-judicial officers. Id. at 95. The case dealt principally with errors
of judgment within jurisdiction, not malicious or corrupt acts and thus cited precedent that
is consistent only with the proposition that good faith errors are not actionable. For example,
the case cites Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845), which at least impliedly imposed
liability for malicious and corrupt acts. But Downer also cites a New York case of the same
year as Kendall, Wilson v. Mayor of New York, 1 Denio 595, 43 Am. Dec. 719 (1845), that,
although of obviously less precedential value than the Kendall decision, extended judicial immunity
to any judicial act "no matter how gross or corrupt." Wilson v. Mayor of New York, 1 Denio
595 (1845). That some immunity existed may have been "beyond controversy." The scope and
extent of that immunity, however, was far from clear in the early California cases.
93. 56 Cal. 65 (1880).
94. See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. Ashburn, 173 Cal. App. 2d 624, 629, 343 P.2d 931, 933
("The clear line of California decisions begins with the early case of Turpen v. Booth.").
95. 56 Cal. at 69.
96. See id. at 68, 69.
97. Pickett v. Wallace, 57 Cal. 555 (1881). Although Pickett may be said to be the first
California Supreme Court decision on judicial immunity applied in favor of a judge, a better
description might be "the first published decision." In an unreported decision in 1859, Den
v. Fernald, 1 C.U. 70 (1859), the California Supreme Court applied the doctrine to immunize
a judge from liability. The court evoked the historical aspects of the doctrine but, citing no
supporting authority whatever, ruled that a judge could not be responsible for any error committed
within the scope of his jurisdiction. Id.
98. 57 Cal. 555 (1881).
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absolutely immune from liability, even if their acts had been
malicious.99
By 1907, any doubt as to the extent of the immunity afforded by
0 the
the "California doctrine"'0 0 was removed. In Wyatt v. Arnot,"'
California Court of Appeal chose not to follow those states that
distinguished good faith errors and malicious acts:
The California doctrine is founded upon a deeply rooted principle
of the common law and in none of the cases in which the rule is
attempted to be modified or extended is there to be discovered any
sound reason why the rule as it is followed in this state should be
02
varied from.
In reaching this conclusion, Wyatt regarded the Turpen review of the
"leading cases" as "particularly valuable."'0 3 The review in Turpen,
however, was no more valuable than that of the Bradley court in
terms of analysis. This reliance on a "deeply rooted principle of the
common law," ' '0 4 then, was as analytically defective as the misinterpretation and misapplication of the common law by the Bradley
court.'0 5
Though the "root" of absolute judicial immunity could accurately
have been described as deep, the depth of the doctrinal entrenchment
was more a function of rapid and hearty growth rather than the sustained allegiance to the common law tradition to which chief proponents of the doctrine continued to allude.' 0 6 The common law
recognized distinctions between the jurisdictional limits of varied courts
for reasons that may have been appropriate only in their historical
context' 0 7 and recognized the most egregious conduct of a judge as
being essentially an excess of jurisdiction and hence actionable.' 0 8 The
American deviation from these common law concepts resulted in the
adoption of an overbroad scope of judicial immunity. The excessive
scope of judicial immunity became increasingly problematic with the
enactment of the Civil Rights Acts."0 9
99. Id. at 557.
100. See infra, note 102 and accompanying text.
101. 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 P. 86 (1907).
102. Id. at 227.
103. Id. at 225.
104. Id. at 227.
105. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 33-62 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 60-62 and accompanying text.
109. See Maher, Federally-Defined Judicial Immunity Some Quixotic Reflections on an
Unwarranted Imposition, 88 DICK. L. REv. 326, 336 (1984).
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THE CIVIL

RIGHTS ACTS

At approximately the same time Bradley v. Fisher was decided, the

efforts of the reconstruction era Congress to protect fundamental civil
rights became manifest in constitutional amendments and congressional

enactments." ' In 1865, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866,1"
granting citizenship to all persons born in the United States without

regard to color. Civil rights advocates, in an effort to protect the
rights recognized therein from subsequent congressional diminution,
sought to make provisions of the Act permanent by constitutional
amendment." 2 The fourteenth amendment was meant to incorporate
provisions of the 1866 Act." 3 One year later, the fifteenth
amendment ' "4 was ratified adding the right to vote to those rights
protected by the Constitution." ' To enforce the provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, Congress enacted the Enforcement
Act of May 31, 1870,116 providing, inter alia, for criminal penalties
for violations of the 1866 Act.
As a result of continuing violations of the civil rights of blacks
in the South by the Ku Klux Klan, Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan
Act'"7 "to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment . . .
and for other purposes. '""I8 Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act was
subsequently codified at 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the statute under

110. Prior to Reconstruction, constitutional protection of individual rights was available
only against infringement by the federal government. Individual acts or actions by state or
local governments depriving citizens of fundamental rights were not protected by the first ten
amendments. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (1 Pet.) 243 (1833). This limitation reflected
the Framers' fears of a powerful federal government and their belief that the states were the
better guardians of individual rights. After the Civil War, however, congressional enactments
reflected a view of the federal government as the protector of individual civil rights. The thirteenth amendment, for example, in addition to abolishing slavery, empowered Congress to enact
appropriate enforcement legislation. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XII, §1; U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIII, §2. For a discussion of the genesis of Section 1983, see R. Freilich & R. Carlisle, Comment: Municipal Liability Under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871-An Historical Perspective,
in Section 1983 Sword And Shield, A.B.A. See. of Urban, State and Local Government Law
24, (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle, eds. 1983).
111. 14 Stat. 27 (1865).
112. See R. Freilich & R. Carlisle, supra note Ill at 25.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment reads in part: "Section 1. All
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and the state wherein they reside ..
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
115. U.S. CoNST. amend. XV, §1.
116. 16 Stat. 140 (1870), amended 16 Stat. 433.
117. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
118. Id.
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which most "civil rights" cases are now brought. The Ku Klux Klan
Act provided for civil and criminal penalties for the deprivation of
rights under color of law," 9 empowered the President to enforce the
Act when state and local officials failed to do so, 2 ' and provided

a private cause of action against any official who failed to provide
the guaranteed protection.' 2 ' Additional legislation followed the Ku
Klux Klan Act. In 1875 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875122
prohibiting discrimination on the ground of race or color in public
places. The civil rights act permitted victims of discrimination to
recover five hundred dollars for each violation and gave federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction.' 23
To summarize, the civil rights acts provided, inter alia, a private
cause of action for money damages against a person who, acting under
color of state law deprives another of a federal right. Congress enacted
Section 1983 to provide an independent avenue to protect federal constitutional rights, because state courts were being used to harass and
injure individuals. 124 The Congressional intent to protect fundamental civil rights from abridgment by state courts continues to conflict
12
with the common law principles of judicial immunity. 1
A.

Judicial Immunity and the Civil Rights Acts
As early as 1879, the United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte
Virginia'26 reasoned that Congressional authority to enforce provisions
of the fourteenth amendment through Section 4 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875127 reached unconstitutional state judicial actions and held
that a judge could be criminally liable.' 28 Liability was based on the
ministerial rather than judicial nature of the act complained of and
the Court implied that if the judge had been performing a judicial
function, he would not be protected by judicial immunity.' 29
Although the Civil Rights Acts created a civil cause of action for
119. Id. at §2.
120. Id. at §3.
121. Id. at §1.
122. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
123. Id.
124. See Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1980.
125. See infra notes 126-151 and accompanying text.
126. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
127. 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (currently at 18 U.S.C. §243).
128. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 349.
129. Id. at 348-49. "It is idle ... to say that the act ... is unconstitutional because it inflicts
penalties upon state judges for their judicial action. It does no such thing." Id.
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any person who, under color of state law, causes a violation of civil
rights, the issue of the civil liability of a judge under the Acts was
not addressed by a federal court until 1945. In Picking v. Pennsylvania
Railroad'" the Third Circuit held that judicial immunity was no defense
to a Section 1983 action brought against a judge.' 3 ' The analysis in
Picking of the congressional intent behind Section 1983 to reach all
state officials or officers acting under color of any law, including
judges, was short-lived and unpopular in the circuits.' 32 Largely as
a result of the United States Supreme Court holding in Tenny v.
Brandhove,133 that state legislators were immune from civil liability
for actions within the scope of their legislative activities, federal courts
deviated from the Picking rationale. The courts reasoned that since
judicial immunity is at least as well grounded in history as legislative
immunity, judicial immunity would bar similar actions against judges.' 34
The Third Circuit finally overruled Picking in 1966.' 35 The analogy
to legislative immunity, however, is not entirely accurate. Legislative
immunity and judicial immunity derive from separate, conceptually
distinct sources in the common law.' 36 Therefore, the factors that require full legislative immunity may not necessarily require judicial immunity, particularly in the context of a civil rights action.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the
civil liability of a judge under Section 1983 in 1967 in Pierson v.
Ray. 3 7 Pierson held that, absent express congressional language
abrogating the common law doctrine of judicial immunity, judicial
immunity operated as a complete defense to a Section 1983 action
against a judge. 138 Pierson relied to a large extent on the circuit court39
decisions that utilized Tenney to support absolute judicial immunity.1
Though Pierson was the first United States Supreme Court pronouncement on judicial immunity since Bradley, and the first decision of that Court dealing with judicial liability under Section 1983,
130. 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
131. See id. at 250-51.
132. By 1955 the Picking holding had been picked apart and criticized in nearly all of the
federal circuits. See, e.g., Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1955), ("But courts
generally have refused to accept the holding in [Picking] as the correct view of the law.").
133. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
134. See e.g., Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1955).
135. See Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966) cert. denied 386 U.S. 1021 (1967).
136. "The Privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process has taproots in
the Parliamentary struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
137. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
138. Id. at 553-55.
139. Id. at 559 n.9.
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analysis of congressional intent and statutory interpretation of Section 1983 was conspicuously absent. As Justice Douglas pointed out
in his dissent,'4 0 the majority simply did not address the fact that
every member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that judges
would be liable.'' To some extent, Pierson relied on the availability
of judicial42review of the violative act as precluding the need for judicial
liability.'
The ultimate synthesis of the Bradley and Pierson decisions, extending absolute judicial immunity to all judicial acts regardless of the
nature or intent occurred in Stump v. Sparkman.' 3 In Stump, a county
judge in an exparte action approved a petition presented by the mother
of a minor to have a tubal ligation performed on the minor.' 44 The
minor was sterilized after being told that she was having an appendectomy performed. The sterilization was discovered after the minor's
marriage and unsuccessful attempts to conceive. Her Section 1983 action against the judge was dismissed by the U.S. District Court.'4 ,
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.' 46 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the District Court
and upheld absolute judicial immunity in a Section 1983 action.' 47
Stump placed no emphasis on the availability of alternative means
of judicial review and "right vindication." Obviously, no meaningful
judicial review of Judge Stump's action was possible. Stump relied
on the jurisdictional test of Bradley.'"8 The court undertook an excruciatingly painful analysis of the statutory authority under which
Judge Stump's jurisdiction could be found.""
Stump announced a new test for distinguishing a "judicial act." 50
140.
141.

Id. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. Of particular interest is the fact that the judge protected in Pierson was a police

court justice. This extension of immunity to the inferior courts of limited jurisdiction is not
wholly consistent with reliance placed by the majority on Bradley and the common law. See
Roth & Hagan, supra note 77, at 5.
142. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554.
143. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
1,14.Id. at 351 n.l.
145. Sparkman v. McFarland, 552 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1977).
146. Id.
147. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356, 357 (1978).
148. Id. at 356 quoting Bradley v. Fisher at 652.
149. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 358-359.
150. See Id. at 362. "The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether
an act is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e. whether they dealt
with the judge in his judicial capacity." Id.
Mr. Justice Stewart in dissent raised the question of whether or not an ex parte judicial action

approving a petition to sterilize a minor is a "function normally performed by a judge." Id.
at 366 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The test functionally ignores any distinction between judicial and
ministerial acts and, instead, places emphasis only on whether the
act is normally performed by a judge. This emphasis ignores the essential element of discretion that is inherent in the definition of "judicial."
Stump remains the standard by which judicial immunity protecting
judges from civil liability for damages is upheld.' 5 1 The extent of protection by way of other remedies, such as prospective injunctive or
declaratory relief, or by way of liability for attorneys' fees was yet
to be settled. The American version of the common law doctrine of
judicial immunity remained unassailable, from Bradley to Pierson to
Stump, until Pulliam v. Allen.
B.

Judicial Immunity, Civil Rights, and Attorneys' Fees

The tensions between the doctrine of judicial immunity and civil
rights enforcement legislation was aggravated by subsequent, concurrent federal and state policies manifesting a desire to award attorneys'
fees to successful public interest litigants. This tripartite tension between doctrine, law, and policy was the subject of Pulliam v. Allen.' 52
In Pulliam, the United States Supreme Court held that judicial immunity is no bar to prospective injunctive relief in a Section 1983
action and, when such relief is granted, judges may be liable for attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to Section 1988.153
In Pulliam, a Virginia magistrate maintained a practice of imposing bail on persons arrested for non-jailable offenses and incarcerating
those persons when they could not meet bail.' 5 4 A Section 1983 action was filed in the federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against this practice. The district court granted the relief and
attorneys' fees were awarded.' The Court of Appeals affirmed.' 5 6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
"whether judicial immunity bars the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 against a member of the judiciary
acting in his judicial capacity."' 57 In order to reach that question,
however, the Supreme Court turned to "the more fundamental ques151.
nor, J.,
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See e.g., Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1983 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., O'Condissenting).
104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
Id. at 1981, 1982.
Id. at 1971.
See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 1973.
See Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376 (1982).
See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 1974.
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tion. . .whether a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity should
be immune from prospective injunctive relief.""' 8
The analysis of the Court began with the "assumption""' that common law judicial immunity "should not be abrogated absent clear
legislative intent to do so.""'6 The Court was correct in relying on
the common law but, as this comment has indicated, the accuracy
with which the Court has interpreted the common law has consistently been questionable.' 6 ' In analyzing the common law, the Court
analogized to the common law "prerogative writ'' 6 2 to find a parallel
to injunctive relief. The Court noted that the King's Bench exercised
collateral control over inferior rival courts.' 63 Significantly, the Court
also noted that writs were "particularly useful in exercising collateral
control over the ecclesiastical courts, since the King's Bench exercised
no direct review over those tribunals."' 64 In Stump, in which no degree
of review would have afforded relief to the aggrieved party for the
wrongful sterilization, the argument that liability should be predicated,
at least partially, on the availability of review was not even considered.
The Court found no inconsistency in granting judges immunity from
civil liability for damages while allowing injunctive relief from judicial
actions.' 6 None of the arguments supporting judicial immunity from
damages is applicable in a case like Pulliam.'66 The jurisdictional limitations on equitable actions counterbalance the risk of harrassing and
vexatious litigation.' 67 Extraordinary writs are still reserved for "really
extra-ordinary causes."' 68 Existing principles of federalism and comity
'
restrain unnecessary federal court intrusion into state process. 61
The relationship the Court perceived between Section 1983 and
judicial immunity was that judicial immunity operates to limit relief
under Section 1983, not that Section 1983 limits judicial immunity.
If a limitation is imposed on the availability of relief under Section
1983, that limitation must come from Congress.' 71 Pulliam thus
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 73-109 and accompanying text.
162. See Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1974-78.
163. Id. at 1976.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1978-79.
166. Id. at 1978; see S. Shapiro, The Propriety of Prospective Relief and Attorneys' Fees
Awards Against State Court Judges in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 17 AKRON L.REv. 25,
36 (1983).
167. See Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1978.

168.

See Id. at 1979 n.17 and accompanying text.

169. Id. at 1980.
170. Id.
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validated the interpretation in Ex Parte Virginia that Section 1983
reaches judicial actions.' 7 1 Furthermore, the Pulliam Court held that
there is nothing to suggest that Congress intended to expand the common law doctrine of judicial immunity to immunize judges from prospective injunctive relief.'72
Although the Court recognized the similarity between prohibited
monetary damages and attorneys' fees,"' the Court still awarded attorneys' fees against the judge. This part of the holding was reached
by noting the manifest congressional intent to award attorneys' fees
even when damages would be barred by immunity.' 74 Judicial immunity
could be no bar to an award of attorneys' fees under Section 1988.
The perceived threat of personal liability for quasi-damagesattorneys' fees-and the "disturbing possibility that judges may be
exposed to damages liability' '1 75 has rallied the bench to a new cry
76
for remedial actions to repair the damage wrought by Pulliam.' The
171. Id. "The interpretation in Ex Parte Virginia of Congress' intent ... has not lost its
force with the passage of time." Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1981.
174. Id. at 1982.
175. See Roth & Hagan, supra note 77 at 11.
176. Stump drew an overwhelming critical response, mostly from those who perceived an
inherent unfairness in the decision. See, e.g., I.M. Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman (98 Sup.
Ct. 1099): The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 VA. L. REV. 833 (1978); Note, Judicial Immunity Tort Liability of a State Court Judge in Grantingthe Sterilization of a Minor Without
Due Process, 22 How. L. J. 129 (1979); Note, Torts-JudicialImmunity-Judge's Erroneous
Grant of a Sterilization Petition Held Not In Clear Absence of Jurisdiction and Therefore
Entitled to the Defense of Judicial Immunity, 11 IND. L. REv. 489 (1978); Note: JudgesImmunities-Judicial Act and Jurisdiction Broadly Defined, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 112 (1978);
Note, Torts-Judicial Immunity: A Sword For the Malicious or a Shield For the Conscientious?, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 141 (1978); Note: Judicial Immunity: An Unqualified Sanction
of Tyranny From the Bench, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 810 (1978); Note, Torts-JudicialImmunityAbsolute Immunity Reaffirmed in Stump v. Sparkman (98 Sup. Ct. 1099), 27 U. KAN. L.
REV. 518 (1979); Note, Courts: Judicial Immunity-Courts of General Jurisdiction, 18 WAsHsuRN
L.J. 158 (1978).
The response to Pulliam by the judiciary, who perceived the decision, at the very least, as
the first snip at the "deep root" of judicial immunity, has been no less overwhelming. See,
e.g., S.Plotkin & C. Mazorol, JudicialMalpractice:Pulliam Is Not The Answer Trial, December
1984, 24; P. Roth & K.Hagan, supra note 77; C. Frank, Suing Judges, Immunity Losses Worrisome, 71 A.B.A.J. 27 (April 1985); Allen, Disrobing Judges, June 1985 California Lawyer
10; C. Frank, JudicialJeopardy Liability Alarm in Rights Cases, 70 A.B.A.J 29 (December 1984).
Pulliam has even been credited with abrogating the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Amicus
Curiae Brief of California Judges Association in Support of the Position of Defendants and
Respondents, at 17, Lezama v. Justice Court, 1st Civ. No. A025829, California Court of Appeal,
1st Dist., Div. 5, filed June 17, 1985; see, also, Note, U. BALT. L. REV., supra at 358.
The holding can hardly be considered an abrogation. "Abrogation" is defined as "The
destruction or annulling of a former law, by an act of the legislative power, by constitutional
authority, or by usage." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 8 (5th ed. 1979). An abrogation presupposes that such immunity in fact existed, and Pulliam held that there never existed any judicial
immunity from prospective injunctive relief. See Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1981.
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direct influence of Pulliam on possible legislative actions'" to create
an immunity where none previously existed by codifying an exception to Section 1988 as to judges, poses a significant threat to the

developing awareness of public interest litigation. Codification of
judicial immunity could threaten the continuing societal benefits derived
from the vindication of civil liberties through public interest litigation.
The effect of Pulliam on claims brought under state statutes intended to encourage civil rights litigation is not clear. This comment
will examine these effects, particularly with respect to the award of
attorneys' fees in California under the California private attorney
general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. To aid in
understanding the relationship between Pulliam and public interest

litigation in California this comment will first examine the history
of 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 and the relationship of this section to the
development of Section 1021.5 in California.
ATTORNEYS'

FEES AwARDS

That parties must bear their own attorneys' fees has been a settled
rule of American law for generations.'
This "American Rule"' 79
is unique to the United States. In most countries, the prevailing party
to a lawsuit is entitled to an award of fees as part of the compensatory damages. The American Rule was an accepted doctrine of
American Jurisprudence as early as 1796'80 and still applies notwithstanding certain exceptions that have developed in federal and state

courts.' 8 '
The holding in Pulliam that a judge may be liable for attorneys' fees under §1988 evoked
considerably more concern from the bench than the holding that injunctive relief would not
be barred by judicial immunity. See C. Frank, JudicialJeopardy-Liability Alarm in Rights
Cases, supra at 29. Even Magistrate Pulliam did not appeal from the award of injunctive relief
against her. See Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1981.
This judicial concern has been manifested in several ways. Legislation has been introduced
that would expand judicial immunity to prohibit Section 1988 awards. See H.R. 877, 99th Cong.
IstSess. (1985). Judges in many states are seeking to clarify the availability of indemnification
by the states to defend any Section 1983 actions brought against judges. See Judges Due Help
in Rights Suits, A.G. Opinion Says, L. A. Daily Journal, June 7, 1985 at 1, col. 2; Shapiro,
supra note 166 at 36. Judicial liability insurance has been made available through the American
Bar Association. The A.B.A. Conference of Chief Justices and the Judicial Immunity Committee
of the A.B.A. selected the National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh as exclusive underwriter of a comprehensive liability policy. The selection was ratified by the A.B.A Board of
Governors in March, 1984. See Roth & Hagan, supra note 77, at 13.
177. H.R. 877, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
178. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122
UNIV. PA. L. Rv.636, 638 (1974).
179. The "American Rule" is "almost unique in the jurisprudential world". See Id. at
637 n.3.
180. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
181. The reasons for departing from the English tradition are not completely clear, but
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A.

Federal Court Exceptions

Exceptions to the American Rule have permitted fee shifting 82 in
the federal courts.' 3 Federal courts have permitted fee awards where
authorized by statute."' Federal courts have also exercised their equity
jurisdiction to create exceptions to the American Rule. Three major
exceptions to the rule that parties must bear their own fees have
evolved. First, under the "bad faith exception", fees have been traditionally awarded when a party brings an action in bad faith, or engages
in bad faith during litigation. 85 Second, the "common fund theory"
has permitted fee shifting to avoid unjust enrichment of a class at
the expense of an individual through whose efforts a common fund
was created.' 86 Third, a more recent exception, the "private attorney
general theory' ' ' 87 arose as a result of the civil rights movement of
the 1960's.
The private attorney general theory developed from statutory fee
awards but achieved principal utility in the expansion of the theory
by federal courts exercising their inherent equitable powers.' 8 8 The
Civil Rights Act of 1964,'89 for example, provided for private enforcement actions and fees for prevailing parties. These statutory fee
provisions were permissive rather than mandatory and federal judges
had discretion whether or not to award them.' 90 In Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc.,'9' the United States Supreme Court stated that:
Congress enacted the provision for counsel fees-not simply to
penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to
American individualism, distrust of lawyers, or an exasperation with anything British have been
suggested as the reasons behind the American Rule. Another reason may have been inflation,
which rendered meaningless early fee statutes in which a specific dollar amount was specified.
See, Comment, supra note 182 at 641, 642.
182. Id.
183. For statutory exceptions, see generally Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U.S. 240, 260 n.33 and statutes cited therein (1975). For equitable exceptions see infra
notes 185-189 and accompanying text.
184. For example, fee awards have been authorized under the Communications Act (47
U.S.C. §206) for copyright violations, under the Merchant Marine Act (46 U.S.C. §1227), under
Patent Laws (35 U.S.C. §285), etc.
185. See Comment, supra note 178 at 660.
186. Id. at 662.
187. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
188. See Comment, The Private Attorney General in California- An Evolution of The
Species, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 843, 844 (1981).
189. 42 U.S.C. §§2000a-2000h-6.
190. Id. "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee. . ." Id.
191. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
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be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured
by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title 11.192

Based upon this reasoning, the Court held that fees should be granted
under the private attorney general theory as a matter of course to
prevailing Title II plaintiffs.' 9 3

Further decisions crystallized the nonstatutory private attorney
general rationale that private citizens should not have to pay for the
privilege of enforcing their own rights. 94 Continued expansion in the
number of fee awards under the private attorney general theory succeeded Piggie Park and the subsequent decisions.'
The theory

burgeoned in the federal courts.' 96
This trend was reversed in 1975 in the United States Supreme Court
decision of Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 1 ,
Aleyska held that the American Rule precluded the allowance of at-

torneys' fees in federal courts on the basis of the private attorney
general theory.

98

Statutory authorization was generally required for

a federal court to award attorneys' fees.

99

In 1976, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards

Act of 1976, codified at 42 U.S.C. Section 1988.200 The Act was passed
in response to Aleyska2 ° ' and to address the congressional perception
of a need to permit parties to recover what it cost them to vindicate
their violated civil rights.202 Congress recognized that "fee shifting
provisions have been successful in enabling vigorous enforcement of
modern civil rights legislation, while at the same time limiting the
growth of the enforcement bureaucracy". 213 Congress further found
192. Id.at 402.
193. The burden shifted to the defendant who was responsible for showing that an award
would be unjust. Id.
194. See Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219
(1st Cir. 1974); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Cornist v. Richland Parish
School Board, 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973);
Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d
885 (9th Cir. 1974).
195. See Comment, supra note 178 at 657.
196. Id.
197. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
198. Id.at 269.
199. Id.
200. 42 U.S.C. §1988.
201. S. REP. No. 94, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5908, 5909.
202. See Id. at 5910; A. Wolff & J. Steptoe, FederalLegislative Outlook for New Opportunities ForFee Awards, COURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUaLIC INTEREST LITIGATION", (Practicing Law Institute (H. Newburg, Ed.) Symposium) 1978, vol. 2 at 392.).
203. See S. REP, supra note 201 at 5911.
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that fee awards were an "integral part" 2
available by the civil rights acts.

'

of the remedies made

Section 1988 provides statutory authority for federal courts to award
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in an action brought under any
of its enumerated statutes."' Section 1988 also applies to actions
brought in state courts to enforce federal civil rights. 0 6 Although
Aleyska precluded the private attorney general theory in federal
courts, 20 7 state courts have continued to apply the theory28 and California has codified the doctrine under Code of Civil Procedure Section
1021.5, which authorizes the award of attorneys' fees in public interest litigation. 20 9
B.

Attorneys' Fees Awards in California

California has followed the American Rule and codified the preclusion of fee shifting in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.210 The
literal provisions of Section 1021 provide for awards of attorneys'
fees only on the basis of contract or specific statutory authority.
However, like the federal courts, California courts have created
equitable exceptions to the American Rule, 2"' among them, the private
attorney general theory.
204. Id. at 5913.
205. See 42 U.S.C. §1988.
206. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980).
207. See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977);
see infra notes 212, 213 and accompanying text.
209. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021.5 provides: "Upon motion, a court may award attorneys'
fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted
in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class
of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make
the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of
the recovery, if any. With respect to actions involving public entitites, this section applies to
allowances against, but not in favor of, public entitites, and no claim shall be required to
be filed therefor."
210. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021 provides: "Except as attorneys fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at
law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties."
211. The "common fund theory" exception in California is based on the same principle
of avoiding unjust enrichment as the exception in the federal courts. See Neal v. County of
Stanislaus, 141 Cal. App. 3d 534, 190 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1983). The "substantial benefit theory"
exception derives from the common fund theory but does not require the creation of a common fund out of which the award is based. The benefit, however, must be substantial and
must derive directly from the decision of the court and not from subsequent legislation resulting
therefrom. For a discussion of the California history of the substantial benefit theory, see Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25 at 38-42, 569 P.2d 1303, 1309-1312, 141 Cal. Rptr 315, 320-24
(1977). Federal and California law are nearly identical as to the substantial benefit exception.
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The private attorney general theory in California survived the
Aleyska decision in Serrano v. Priest."' The California Supreme Court
in Serrano held that because California courts are courts of general
jurisdiction, unlike federal courts of limited jurisdiction, the Aleyska
rationale was not binding on California."1 3 Thus, the private attorney
general theory remained viable in California. Nearly coincidental with
the Serrano decision, California codified and expanded the private
attorney general theory by enacting Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5.21

C. The Private Attorney General Statute, California Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5
The private attorney general statute, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, was enacted to encourage suits that enforce
a strong public policy and that confer a benefit on a broad class of
people. ' Section 1021.5 awards include three major elements. First,
the litigation must result in "the enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest. ' '21 That "important right" may be either
constitutional or statutory. Second, the litigation must confer a significant benefit, either pecuniary or nonpecuniary, upon the general public
or a large class of persons." 7 Third, the necessity and financial burden
of private enforcement must be such that the award is appropriate."t 8
The federal roots of the private attorney general doctrine have been
noted by the California Supreme Court. 2 9 California courts often
follow federal precedent in interpreting the doctrine.220 California courts
have awarded fees under both Section 1021.5 and Section 1988.221
See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 692 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).
The "bad faith exception" available in the federal courts is not consistently available in
California. The appellate courts are split on the issue. See R. PEARL, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS'
FEEs AwARD PRACTICE, California Continuing Education of the Bar, §3.17 (Supplement 1/84

at 30).
212.
213.

20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
Id.

214.
215.

See Comment, supra note 188 at 845.
See id. at 846; Woodland Hills Residents Association v. City Council of Los Angeles,

23 Cal. 3d 917, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200 (1979).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 634, 652 P.2d 985, 993, 186 Cal. Rptr.
754, 762 (1982) ("Framing the private-attorney-general theory in California, both this court
and the legislature relied on federal precedent.") Id.
220. See Westside Community For Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal. 3d 348,
657 P.2d 365, 188 Cal. Rptr. 873.
221. See Schmid v. Lovette, 154 Cal. App. 3d 466, 201 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1984).
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Section 1988 and Section 1021.5 share a common development. They
both represent legislative reponse to the judicial development of the
private attorney general exception to the "American Rule" precluding
fee shifting.2 2 The common development and the identical societal
interests served by both Section 1988 and Section 1021.5253 require
that the same principles be applied with respect to the extent of the
remedies provided. The rationale of Pulliam, with respect to both

the availability of injunctive relief and the award of attorneys' fees
against a judge, is completely harmonious with application of Section 1021.5. A California court, however, has been reluctant to apply
in any broader context than the
the principles enunciated in Pulliam
224
narrowest Section 1988 situation.

POST-PULLIAM JUDICIAL IMMUNITY AND PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA

In February, 1985, the First District Court of Appeal decided the
first California case discussing the possibility of a Pulliam approach
to Section 1021.5. In Lezama v. Justice Court,22 5 the plaintiff and
other members of the United Farmworkers Union had been charged
in San Benito County Justice Court with various misdemeanor charges
arising from a labor dispute. Justice Court Judge Bernard McCullough
appointed defense counsel on the basis of indigency. Judge McCullough
subsequently assessed legal fees against the "indigents" without any
hearing to determine the defendants' ability to pay. California Penal
Code Section 987.8 expressly requires a hearing and notice of hearing in addition to providing for other procedural and evidentiary
rights.226
After conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the plaintiffs filed
a Section 1983 action against the Justice Court alleging civil rights
222. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 188 at 847 ("This holding [in Woodland Hills Residents
Assn. v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 593 P.2d 200, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979)] is based
on the the legislature's reliance on these federal cases in drafting section 1021.5").
223. Compare, Newman v. Piggie Park, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) ("Congress
enacted [§19881 ....not simply to penalize ....but, more broadly, to encourage individuals
injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.") with, Woodland Hills
Residents Assn. v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 933, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 511, 593 P.2d 200,
208 (1979) ("[T]he fundamental objective of the private attorney general doctrine of attorney
fees is to 'encourage suits effectuating a strong [public] policy by awarding substantial attorney's
fees.... to those who successfully bring such suits and thereby bring about benefits to a broad
class of citizens'. . . .[citations].").
224. See Lezama v. Justice Court, 165 Cal. App. 3d 287, modified, reh'g. granted (1985).
225. Id.
226. Id.at 290, 291.
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violations and violations of California Penal Code section 987.8.227
Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate ordering the Justice Court to set
aside the order of legal fees.22 Plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief
as to the section 987.8 and Section 1983 violations, and an injunction against further violations. 29 Finally, plaintiffs sought an award
of fees under both the federal statute, Section 1988, and the California statute, Section 1021.5.230
The trial court ordered the Justice Court to set aside the order requiring plaintiffs to pay legal fees but refused to grant the attorneys'
fees under either Section 1988 or Section 1021.5, or to grant the
underlying declaratory or injunctive relief upon which the attorneys'
fees might be based. The trial court based the refusal to grant injunctive relief and attorneys' fees on the grounds that the trial court
lacked the authority to grant such relief against another court. 23 ' Plaintiffs appealed.
Seemingly in reliance on Pulliam, the court of appeals permitted
the award of attorneys' fees against the judge under Section 1021.5
and remanded to the trial court to determine whether a Section 1988
award would be appropriate.232 The award of attorneys' fees against
the judge, rather than the court, was significant. Prior interpretations
of judicial immunity had permitted awards only against the court as
2 33
a public entity.
The original opinion was modified on March 19, 1985,34 in response
to pressure exerted by judges.23 5 The modification made clear that,
although injunctive relief would clear the hurdle of judicial immunity, no award of attorneys' fees would be available against individual
judges performing their judicial functions, but only against the court
227. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Lezama v. Justice Court, No. A025829, February 26, 1985, 85 D.A.R. 734, for
text of the original, unmodified opinion.
233. See Rhyne v. Municipal Court, 113 Cal. App. 3d 807, 825, 170 Cal. Rptr. 312, 324
(1980). Judicial "public entities" as opposed to judges have been included in the enumeration
of groups of defendants against whom a Section 1021.5 award may be recovered. "If judicial
public entities are to be excluded from these broad statutory definitions, the legislative purpose
will be frustrated in some most substantial manner." Id.
234. See 85 D.A.R. 940 for text of the Modification Order.
235. See The Daily Recorder, Friday, May 24, 1985, at 3. ("Leo Weisman, clerk of the
appeal court's division five, said recently that after the justices ruled in Lezama, they received

a letter from James Wright, presiding judge of Santa Clara County Superior Court, [the Lezana
action was based in San Benito County] requesting a rehearing on the case. The appeal court
agreed on March 22 to grant a rehearing. It also allowed the judges [California Judges Association] to file an amicus brief.") Id.
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as a public entity. 236 Three days after the modification, the Presiding

Judge of the First District, on his own motion, granted a rehearing.
The Lezama opinion has raised major issues concerning the scope
of judicial immunity in California with respect to public interest litigation and attorneys' fees awards. In the following sections, this comment will address those issues. The issues concern the applicability
of judicial immunity as a defense to (1) injunctive relief and declaratory
relief in California; (2) awards of attorneys' fees under Section 1021.5;
and (3) an award of damages in a civil action. In each of the above
situations, the rationale of Pulliam will be found to be applicable.
In the first two cases, injunctive relief and awards under Section
1021.5, Pulliam counsels the denial of judicial immunity as a defense.
In the third case, an action for damages, Pulliam provides an opportunity for reassessment of the extent of judicial immunity as to
damages.
A.

Judicial Liability for Injunctive Relief in California

Although the powers and scope of the federal courts differ from
state courts, the reasoning of Pulliam is persuasive in arguing that
judicial immunity does not bar injunctive relief against a judge. Pulliam
was not a product of any special circumstances peculiar to federal
civil rights laws. Rather, Pulliam relied almost entirely on the absence
of any common law judicial immunity as to injunctive relief.237 Pulliam
refused to impute to Congress any intent to limit the extent of injunctive relief.238
Common law reliance is appropriate, then, in analogizing to California law. Injunctive relief is discretionary under California Code of
Civil Procedure Section 526.239 Section 526 codifies the common law
provisions for injunctive relief as an equitable remedy.240 Since the
common law never had a provision for judicial immunity against injunctive relief,2"' no evidence is needed of express legislative intent
to abrogate a doctrine that never existed.242 Furthermore, prospective
236. See Lezama v. Justice Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d modified, re'hg. granted, at 293.
237. See Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1980. "There is little support in the common law for a
rule of judicial immunity that prevents injunctive relief against a judge." Id.

238.

See id. at 1980, citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) for the proposition that

in the absence of any "affirmative congressional intent to insulate judges from the reach of
the remedy Congress provided" the Court would not impute such intent.
239. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §526.
240. See City of Pasadena v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 781 (1910).
241. See Pulliam 104 S. Ct. at 1978-80.
242. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
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injunctive relief awarded against a judge is arguably no more disturbing to the principles of judicial independence and finality of decision
than direct review on appeal.

Declaratory relief is also discretionary in California and made
available under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1060.243
Provisions for declaratory relief are a relatively recent enactment in
Californa2 " and thus lack the "deep common law roots" upon which
to conclude that California has no common law history of judicial
immunity as to declaratory relief.2 4 1 Nonetheless, as a general prop24 6
osition, declaratory relief is generally less drastic than injunctive relief
and no persuasive reasons exist to immunize a judge from declaratory
relief. In any event, regardless of the propriety of declaratory relief
against a judge as a general proposition, after Pulliam a state court

judge has no judicial immunity from declaratory relief in a Section
1983 action. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts to decide Section 1983 cases.247 To allow the defense of judicial
immunity in a Section 1983 action brought in a superior state court
against a state court judge, but to deny, on the basis of Pulliam,
the immunity defense in a similar action brought in a federal court,
would encourage forum shopping and violate settled principles of
federalism. 48
243.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1060.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1060 was enacted in 1921.
245. See Pulliam 104 S. Ct. at 1978-1980.
246. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-468 (1974). "Congress plainly intended
declaratory relief to act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction.. .It]he express
purpose of the Federal Declaratory Judgement Act was to provide a milder alternative to the
injunction remedy." Id., quoting from Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-12 (1981).
247. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3, n. 1 (1980); Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d
621, 638 n. 27, 652 P.2d 985, 996 n. 27, 186 Cal. Rptr. 754, n. 27. (1982); Green v. Zank,
158 Cal. App. 3d 497, 502, 204 Cal. Rptr. 770, 773 (1984).
248. One principal concern of federal courts is the proliferation of Section 1983 actions
in already-crowded federal courts. The limitation of public interest litigation to only those actions
that can be framed within the parameters of a federal statutory cause of action, i.e. Section
1983, would only aggravate the problem. State courts serve a parallel role in the protection
of fundamental rights and state courts should be the forum in which many of the civil rights
cases are litigated. A recent federal court case, Newman v. Village of Hinsdale, 592 F. Supp.
1307 (N.D. Ill., E.D. 1984), illustrates the problem. In Newman a pedestrian brought an action
against the Village of Hinsdale and a village policeman alleging a fourth amendment violation.
The plaintiff alleged that, because there was snow on the sidewalk, he decided to walk in the
street. The policeman defendant told the plaintiff to walk on the sidewalk but the plaintiff
disobeyed. The plaintiff was issued a traffic ticket for violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
After two weeks of griping to the chief of police, the plaintiff appeared at traffic court and
the ticket was dismissed. Plaintiff subsequently filed a two-count complaint in federal court
based on Section 1983, alleging that the policeman violated his fourth amendment rights by
stopping him to issue the traffic ticket.
The plaintiff described his case as one which "shocks the conscience [and] is fundamentally

244.
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The primary policy supporting absolute judicial immunity from
damages is the necessity of permitting a judge to exercise his judg-

ment without fear of personal liability.

49

This policy is not threat-

2 50
ened by the award of injunctive or declaratory relief against a judge.

Another policy argument, the need for decisional finality, is similarly
unendangered by the grant of declaratory or injunctive relief. The
offensive to civilized society." Nevertheless, District Judge Kocoras, in an opinion highly critical
of what Judge Kocoras perceives as civil rights cases "endeavor[ing] to transform even the
most petty complaints against local governments into federal cases of constitutional dimension," granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the policeman had probable
cause to stop plaintiff. District Judge Kocoras utilized the decision as an opportunity to comment on the fact that "federal courts in recent years have been snowed under with section
1983 suits. In a distressingly great number of these cases, constitutional law has been trivialized,
and federal courts often have been converted into small-claims tribunals," Id., citing Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554, n.131. Judge Kocoras further noted that "many of these socalled civil rights actions have proven to have nothing whatever to do with civil rights as that
term is normally understood." Id. The rush to litigate Section 1983 actions, according to Judge
Kocoras, was further aggravated by the congressional authority to award attorneys fees under
Section 1988 to prevailing Section 1983 litigants. "When every misstep by the government,
no matter how slight, is seized upon as creating a cause of action entitling its holder to a
chance at receiving a cash jackpot from a federal jury, plus an award of attorney's fees as
an automatic bonus, important values are lost and the Constitution comes to be looked upon
as sort of lottery ticket." Id. at 1308.
The point to be made is that an "extraordinary increase" in federal court Section 1983 litigation
has occurred. Id. at 1308, n.1. See also Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1988 (Powell, J. dissenting).
The increase will only continue if public interest litigation barred by state court judicial immunity can be brought in a federal court.
249. Judge Friendly has described this fear of personal liability as the "in terrorem" effect.
In Law Students Civil Rights Research Coun. Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) he wrote, "The grant of injunctive relief in a case like this would not have the in terrorem
effect on state judges that the threat of a subsequent damage action would have. . ." Id.
For a case in which a judge was literally placed in terrorem by the effect of his own practices, see Doe v. McFaul, 599 F. Supp. 1421 (E.D. Ohio 1984). In McFaul, Judge Leodis Harris
of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court watched a television movie entitled "Scared Straight."
He then made arrangements for his juvenile offenders to "spend time" at the county jail.
Judge Harris instituted this novel procedure without the benefit of any legal authority or professional consultation. Initially, his practice was to send juveniles to the adult jail for "a few
hours" but eventually he began incarcerating them for "days." As many as 250 juveniles as
young as 13 years old went through the "Scared Straight Program." At least one was raped
and many were threatened and assaulted. Judge Harris, apparently "scared straight", discontinued the program. Two of the juveniles brought an action alleging deprivations of constitutional and statutory rights. Although Judge Harris was not named as a defendant, judicial
immunity was held to bar any recovery by the plaintiffs against a superior court judge who
failed to overrule the orders of Judge Harris. Furthermore, even though the court noted, in
dicta, that if Judge Harris had been named as a defendant, the plaintiffs' ("defendants" below)
lacked standing because Judge Harris had discontinued his violative practices. This lack of
standing would have precluded a Pulliam award of declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. at 1434
n.6. At the very least, McFaul supports the argument that jurisdictional limitations to injunctive
relief constrain any "floodgates" argument that opponents of Pulliam might suggest. McFaul
also tends to refute the belief expressed in Pulliam that the times have changed since the enactment of the Civil Rights Acts, and that state courts no longer serve to harrass individuals.
See Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1981.
250. See, e.g., Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1981 n.22 ("[T]here is no merit to the dissenters'
insistence that the scope of the injunctive order entered here illustrates the threat to judicial
independence inherent in allowing injunctive relief against judges.").
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existence of jurisdictional prerequisites to the grant of equitable
remedies insures that injunctive or declaratory relief do not become
means to avoid direct review. Pulliam noted:
For the most part, injunctive relief against a judge raises concerns
different from those addressed by the protection of judges from

damages awards. The limitations already imposed by the requirements
for obtaining equitable relief against any defendant - a showing
of an inadequate remedy at law and of a serious risk of irreparable
harm . ..severely curtail the risk that judges will be harrassed.25'
Pulliam then compared the limitations of a mandamus proceeding
which has "the unfortunate consequence of making the judge a
litigant ' 25 2 noting that such actions should be reserved for "really
extraordinary causes."253
Pulliam does not limit the injunctive relief analysis to federal civil
rights actions. On the contrary, the holding of Pulliam states that
"judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against
a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity. ' 254 In reaching this
holding, Pulliam distinguished a Section 1983 action only for the purposes of resolving "the other concern raised by collateral injunctive
relief against a judge, ' 255 a concern as to the proper relationship between federal and state judges. Pulliam noted that the concern is "not
one primarily of judicial independence, properly addressed by a doctrine of judicial immunity ' 25 6 but, rather "a matter of comity and
federalism, independent of principles of judicial immunity." 2 7 The
availability of injunctive and declaratory relief against a judge in federal
civil rights actions to enforce federal constitutional and statutory rights
is persuasive as to the availability of such relief in a state court action brought to enforce state statutory and constitutional rights. Pulliam
is similarly persuasive in resolving the more difficult issue of whether
judicial immunity operates as a defense to awards of attorneys' fees
under Section 1021.5.
B. .-Judicial Liability for Attorneys' Fees Awards in California
Lezama apparently concluded that judicial immunity bars the award
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1978, 1979.
Id. at 1979 (quoting from Ex Parte Fahey, 322 U.S. 258, 260 (1967)).
Id.
Id. at 1981.
Id. at 1979.
Id.
Id.
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of attorneys' fees against a judge.25 8 However, the Pulliam analysis

of the relation between judicial immunity and Section 1988 is applicable
in reaching the more appropriate conclusion: judicial immunity is no
bar to attorneys' fees awarded under Section 1021.5. In Pulliam, no

underlying immunity was found for the relief sought under any one
of the statutes enumerated in Section 1988.259 Thus, attorneys' fees

could be awarded. Furthermore, the Pulliam court held that even if
the defendant were immune from damages liability, Section 1988 would

impose liability for attorneys' fees.26° The Pulliam court reached this
holding by analyzing the legislative intent behind Section 1988.261'

The legislative history of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5 is not as well documented as that of Section 1988 with
respect to whether the California legislature considered the effect of

judicial immunity on the awards of attorneys' fees under Section

1021.5. Subsequent decisions,2 62 though, have interpreted the statute

and the relation between the California statute and Section 1988. The
development of Section 1021.5 so closely parallels the development

of Section 1988263 that, even absent any express indication that the
California legislature intended to impinge or expand on any common
law doctrine of judicial immunity, implicit in the enactment of Section 1021.5 and subsequent judicial interpretations is a parallelism
in the spirit, intent and policies surrounding the recognition of fee

shifting as an important impetus to public interest litigation. The spirit
and purpose of Section 1021.5 would be frustrated if a litigant were
solely
unable to vindicate abridged statutory and constitutional rights
26
attorney.
the
of
fees
the
afford
to
inability
an
of
because
258. See supra notes 232-236 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 159-174 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
262. See e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Assn. v. City Council of Los Angeles, 23 Cal.
3d 917, 934, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 593 P. 2d 200 (1979) ("It is clear from both the statutory
framework and language that in drafting Section 1021.5 the Legislature relied heavily on the
pre-Aleyska federal private attorney general authorities.., indeed, we do not doubt that in
significant measure the legislation was an explicit reaction to the United States Supreme Court's
Aleyska decision."); see infra notes 257, 258 and accompanying text.
263. See Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 632, n.14, 652 P.2d 985, n.14, 186 Cal. Rptr.
754, n. 14 (1982):
The [federal statute] most frequently compared with section 1021.5 is 42 United States
Code Section 1988... Section 1021.5 has also been described as a legislative response
to Aleyska. (See, e.g., Woodland Hills HI, supra, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 934; Common
Cause v. Stirling (1981) 119 Cal. App. 3d. 658, 662-663 174 Cal. Rptr 2001, citing
Review of Selected 1977 California Legislation (1978) 9 PAc. L. J. 281, 365-367;
County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, supra 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 89, n. 2.).
See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
264. The spirit and purpose of §1021.5 is to encourage public interest litigation. See, e.g.,
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The plain language of Section 1021.5 provides that ". . . this section applies to allowances against, but not in favor of, public entities. .. 26- and courts have held that award of fees can run against
a municipal court as a public entity. 266 Personal liability of a judge
is effectively indistinguishable from the liability of the court, when
the state provides for indemnification and defense of any claim brought
against the judge for attorneys' fees. The California Attorney General
has filed an opinion concluding that the state has a duty to defend
and indemnify a state court judge in any action for attorneys' fees
arising under a civil rights violation. 267 The opinion was requested
on behalf of retired judges who had expressed concern over their personal liability after Pulliam.2 68
Although the Attorney General's Opinion in a narrow sense concluded "that a retired judge sitting by assignment is entitled to indemnification under California Government Code Sections 825-825.6
for plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs awarded in an action under
the federal Civil Rights Act." ,269 the opinion was not limited to either
retired judges or federal civil rights actions. The opinion was based
on the fact that, under California Government Code sections
995-996.6,27 ° public entities must provide for the defense of public
employees sued on account of an act or omission in the scope of
employment. California has included judges and judicial officers within
the definition of public employees .271 Thus judges come within the
scope of the indemnity provisions of Government Code sections 995996.6.7 In order to respond to the narrow issue raised in the request
for the opinion, that is, whether a retired judge is entitled to
indemnity,2 73 the opinion necessarily had to conclude that an employed
judge was entitled to the indemnity.
Woodland Hills Residents Assn. v. City Council of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 933, 154
Cal. Rptr. 503, 511, 593 P.2d 200, 208 (1979) ("The doctrine rests upon the recognition that
privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public
policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism

authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies
will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.").
265. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021.5.
266. See Rhyne v. Municipal Court, 113 Cal. App. 3d. 807; Lezama v. Justice Court, 113
Cal. App. 3d 287.
267. 68 Ops. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 127 (1985).
268. See Judges Due Help in Rights Suits, A.G. Opinion Says, L.A. Daily Journal, June
7, 1985 at 1, col. 2.
269. 68 Ops. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 127, 130 (1985).
270. See id.at 128.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
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Similarly, the fact that the opinion addresses indemnity for liability under federal civil rights actions 274 should not be construed as
limiting the indemnity to such actions. Such a limitation would have
validity only to the extent of any distinctions between federal civil
rights actions and state civil rights actions that underlie the availability
of attorneys' fees awards under either Section 1988 or Section 1021.5.
Federal civil rights actions were enacted to provide a private cause
of action to secure fundamental civil liberties. 2 " Section 1988 was
enacted to provide an impetus to litigate those actions for the public
benefit.176 Similarly, Section 1021.5 provides impetus to litigate similar
actions that confer public benefit. 77 In narrowing the indemnity to
federal civil rights actions, the Attorney General's Opinion was simply
responding to the narrow question raised by the request for the
2 78
opinion.
Indemnity should vitiate judicial concern that personal liability for
attorneys' fees interferes with judicial independence. When the state
or county assumes the duty of defending judges for wrongful judicial
acts the concern focuses not as much on the effect of personal liability
on a freely made decision, but rather on the effects of society subsidizing judicial misconduct. Indemnity provisions may have the effect of providing greater state supervision over judicial conduct in
state courts through existing channels. Supervision of the judiciary
is an established practice that occurs through judicial performance
panels. 279 The recognition of judicial liability for attorneys' fees would
heighten the existing supervisory functions and provide greater
assurances that judges exercise their judicial offices with propriety.
Some states have chosen not to defend judges in actions arising
out of judicial misconduct 20 but, in those states, as well as in Califor274.

See id.

275. See supra notes 110-125 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 210-224 and accompanying text.
278. See 68 Ops. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 127 (1985).
279. See, e.g, Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 29 Cal. 3d 615, 630 P.2d
954, 175 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1981) ("The aim of (the Judicial-Performance] commission proceedings
is . . . to protect the judicial system and the public which it serves.").
280. See Judges Due Help in Rights Suits, A.G. Opinion Says L.A. Daily Journal, supra
note 268:
[Nevada's] Senate Finance Committee rejected a request by the Nevada District Judges
Association to appropriate $41,300 to provide up to $2 Million in insurance coverage
for each of the state's 108 judges. Sen. Joe Neal of Las Vegas, added, "I don't
think it should be the committee's duty to ensure mediocrity in the judiciary. Judges
should render decisions based on what the law states. If they go beyond the law,
they should accept the consequences like everyone else."

Id. at 19.
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nia, the availability of relatively low cost judicial liability insurance 8 '
provides the same protection. The threat of personal liability interfering
with judicial independence is extinguished when personal liability is
vitiated through indemnification. The actual potential liability for attorneys' fees is only as large as the premiums for liability insurance.
Furthermore, the coercive effects perceived by the imposition of liability
for attorneys' fees is arguably no more coercive than liability imposed
on other professionals which generally has resulted in improved,
cautious, and defensive professional practice. 2t 2 In those states that
refuse to acknowledge a duty to indemnify judges, or where the judge

is not as clearly a "public employee",

83

liability insurance vitiates

personal liability for judicial malpractice in much the same way as
personal liability is vitiated by other professional malpractice insurance.
The award of attorneys' fees is not vulnerable to any constitutional
attack. Although cases interpreting Article III, Section 3 of the California Constitution2 8" have "prohibited the imposition of penalties on
the exercise of judicial judgment", 28 5 such arguments have no force
in the context of attorneys' fees awards under Section 1021.5. Fee
' The
shifting in public interest litigation is simply not a penalty. 86
policy stated in Piggie Park and cited with approval in numerous
California cases is to encourage public interest litigation, not to penalize
unsuccessful litigants. 8 7
281. "Federal Judges pay $100 a year and state judicial officers - who receive more coverage
pay $425 a year." Allen, supra note 176; See Roth & Hagan, supra note 77 at 13.
282. A research report prepared by The Rand Corporation for the California Postsecondary Education Commission dealt with "the effects of professional liability insurance increases
on the behavior of physicians and the health delivery system in California". The report coneluded that "[o]ur analysis suggests that major increases in malpractice insurance rates
have.. .(14) Encouraged additional procedures... and 'defensive' medical practice... (15) Potentially improved the quality of care... Increased caution and 'defensive' practices may in some
instances help to improve the quality of care." Lipson, Medical Malpractice: The Response
of Physicians to Premium Increases in California, iii, 96, 97 (Prepared for the California PostSecondary Education Commission, November 1976).
The report noted that the malpractice issue has provoked "considerable controversy and much
rhetoric" about the effects of increasing liability insurance premiums. Id. at 97.
283. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
284. CAL. CONsr. art. III, §3. "The powers of state government are legislative, executive,
and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the
others except as permitted by this Constitution." Id.
285. Oppenheimer v. Ashburn, 173 Cal. App. 2d. 624, 627, 343 P.2d 931 (1959).
286. See Wilderness Soc'y. v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, supra notes 94-195 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Filipino Accountants' Association, Inc., v. State Board of Accountancy, 155
Cal. App. 3d 1023, 1030, 204 Cal. Rptr. 913, 916 (1984); Schmid v. Lovette, 154 Cal. App.
3d 466, 476, 201 Cal. Rptr. 424, 429 (1984); Woodland Hills Residents' Assn. v. City Council,
23 Cal. 3d 917, 593 P.2d 200, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979); Marini v. Municipal Court, 99 Cal.
App. 3d 829, 160 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1979).
-
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C. Judicial Liability for Damages in California
The Lezama decision did not address judicial immunity with regard
to damages. The holding in Stump, affording absolute immunity even
for malicious and corrupt judicial acts28 remains good law.289 The
argument can be made, however, that some of the same reasons that
counsel the application of Pulliam to California law290 with respect
to attorneys' fees awards, may justify a qualified immunity protecting only good-faith errors of judgment and judicial discretion. This
treatment of judicial immunity may be more consistent with the common law doctrine and no less damaging to judicial independence.
Pulliam noted that the availability of other relief militated favorably
toward judicial immunity.2 9' Certainly when there are exceptional cases
in which neither direct judicial review nor extraordinary writ would
be of value to the litigant, the societal benefits flowing from partial
judicial liability would exceed the risk of decreased judicial independence. The important policies recognizing the need to provide
a private cause of action to protect civil rights have survived since
the passage of the first federal acts. In Pulliam the Court noted that:
Much has changed since the Civil Rights Acts were passed. It no
longer is proper to assume that a state court will not act to prevent
a federal constitutional deprivation or that a state judge will be implicated in that deprivation.2 92
Despite this claim, state courts continue to harass individuals. Cases
continue to be brought in which the conduct of the judge is beyond
the pale and violations of fundamental rights are still committed by
members of the judiciary. 29' Although the United States Supreme Court
held that compensation through tort recovery from a judge is barred
by judicial immunity, 94 the need to compensate the injured parties
and the desire to encourage public interest litigation should not be
thwarted by eviscerating statutory remedies provided by the civil rights
288. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Greene v. Zank, 158 Cal. App. 3d 497, 508, 204 Cal. Rptr. 770, 777 (1984)
("Thus it is well settled that judges and those performing 'judge-like' functions are absolutely
immune from section 1983 damage liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities.").
290. See supra notes 237-87 and accompanying text.
291. See Pulliam, 104 S. Ct. at 1979.
292.

Id. at 1981.

293. See discussion of Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text. For a review of civil rights actions brought against judges whose conduct ranges
from the ridiculous to the absurd, see Way, A Call For Limits To Judicial Immunity: Must
Judges Be Kings in Their Courts? 64 JUDICATURE 396-399 (1981).
294.

See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57.
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acts and the private attorney general theories. A qualified immunity
protecting only good faith errors of judgment clearly within jurisdiction would be more consistent with the principles of public interest
litigation.29
CONCLUSION

This comment has examined the doctrine of judicial immunity in
relation to public interest litigation in California. By examining the
historical roots of the doctrine, this comment has illustrated that
generations of cases relying upon the historic dimension of the doctrine have failed to recognize the context in which the doctrine
developed. As a result, inconsistencies and inequities were manifest
in the rote adherence to the doctrine. This comment has explored
a perceived diminution in the scope of judicial immunity as a result
of the holding in Pulliam. Pulliam held that the doctrine does not
bar awards of attorneys' fees in civil rights actions under Section 1988.
By examining the development of the Attorneys' Fees Award Act and
the equitable exceptions to the "American Rule" precluding fee
shifting, this comment has suggested the implications of Pulliam for
California public interest litigation.
This comment has concluded that judicial immunity is no bar to
injunctive or declaratory relief against a California judge and, that
when such relief is awarded, a judge may be liable for an award of
attorneys' fees under California Code of Civil Procedure Section
1021.5. Such relief and fee awards do not threaten the policies underlying judicial immunity. Any perceived coercive effect attributed to
judicial liability is futher diminished by the availability of judicial
liability insurance at comparatively low rates.

295. See Roth & Hagan, supra note 77 at 12. Roth & Hagan present the arguments for
and against judicial immunity. In presenting the arguments supporting a qualified immunity
they write:
The courts' role in dispensing justice, for civil litigants as well as the criminally accused,
continues to increase alarmingly, and we can only expect to see more instances of
individual injustice committed under the protection of judicial immunity. It is, therefore,
reasonable to expect that pressure for reform will be tarnished further. This is not

the climate of public or political opinion in which to make a case for judicial immunity or reasonably limited qualifications to it. Better to reform in advance of one's
critics and take the high ground provided by public support. ". . . [T]here is the
argument from the sense of injustice. No one would deny the grossness of facts
presented in cases like Stump, or that many meritorious claims against judicial misconduct are sacrificed to the benefits of the system against the costs to individual litigants?
[sic]."Id.
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Judicial liability for attorneys' fees does not diminish absolute immunity from damages liability. This comment has taken the position
that concerns about the erosion of absolute judicial immunity are unfounded, and has suggested that a qualified immunity as to damages
liability for civil rights actions may be more consistent with the purposes and policies of both the civil rights acts and the doctrine of
judicial immunity.
Peter E. Glick
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